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Chapter 13 
The Sociology of The Politics of Jurisprudence 
Richard Nobles and David Schiff 
In much of his work, Roger Cotterrell has questioned and lamented the tendency of legal philosophy 
and sociology of law to remain closed to each other, and of each to be insufficiently adapted to the 
study of legal practice (e.g. Cotterrell 1975, 1983, 1993, 2002, 2014a). Legal philosophy, with its 
concerns with what is essential to law, has a tendency to develop concepts that generalize at a level of 
abstraction which robs it of any obvious relevance to the day to day practices of lawyers, or the 
information rich empirical studies of the sociology of law (Cotterrell 1989: 2–3). Sociology of law 
can be criticized in turn for insufficient attention to concepts of law, with a resulting tendency to 
generate information organized through partial concepts appropriate to the researched sub-field of 
legal study,1 which do not build any consensus on the general nature of law as social formation. And 
there is also a tendency for sociology of law to seek to distance itself from the discourse of lawyers 
and to focus not on what is said in law by its participants but on the behaviour of those involved in 
law, and on the causes and effects of particular laws. If, as he has claimed (agreeing here with many 
leading legal philosophers) law involves the institutionalized generation of doctrine (1983: 243, 251–
2), then the study of this doctrine, and the role that it plays within law, should not be excluded from 
sociological study. He has argued that there needs to be a closer synthesis of the approaches of legal 
philosophy and the sociology of law, directed to the study of legal practice. This combined approach 
should generate knowledge of legal practice which is not accessible via each separate discipline and, 
on a normative note, could improve the work of jurists, those persons who not only study legal 
systems, but who take some responsibility for their continued existence and enhanced performance 
(Cotterrell, 2013a, or 2013b). His sense of what might constitute enhancement is associated with ideas 
1 Roger observes that sociological concepts of law exhibit more variety and less sophistication than those generated within 
normative legal theory. He attributes this in part to the fact that, within the latter, these concepts are an end in themselves, 
whilst within sociological approaches the conceptualization of law is simply a preliminary stage in the organization of 
empirical study (Cotterrell 1983). 
                                                          
of community. The hoped for outcome of this improved understanding is that law will provide a form 
of regulation that is fit for various kinds of communities (instrumental, affective, traditional and value 
based) and be better able to reconcile the conflicts between these communities.2 
In this chapter we focus on one of Roger’s best known contributions to jurisprudence: The 
Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Cotterrell 1989, 2003, 
hereafter ‘PoJ’). In doing this, we are allowing ourselves, as two of his colleagues at Queen Mary, to 
continue a discussion which has been ongoing in many forms since we first joined him as colleagues 
in 2006. Since 2000, we have been exploring the potential of systems theory to increase our 
understanding of jurisprudence (see especially 2006). Thus we have shared Roger’s belief that a 
sociological approach to jurisprudence could be a profitable addition to a field dominated by 
philosophical approaches. But Roger has expressed considerable reservation as to whether systems 
theory offers an appropriate way forward, questioning the focus of the theory on law’s growth as an 
abstract system, to the neglect of the ‘particular forces and interests that give rise to law’s 
development, inspire its interpretations and guarantee its authority’ (Cotterrell 2003: 250).3 The 
contrasting approach, offered within PoJ, is that ‘normative legal theory’s abstractions should be 
seen, in part, as a response to professional and political needs of people (especially lawyers) with 
specific interests and concerns’ (2003: 250). 
If PoJ were claimed to be a synthesis of philosophical approaches and sociological theory, we 
could present a straightforward comparison between systems theory and whatever sociological 
approach Roger has adopted and adapted. But the aims of PoJ are more limited. The book offers a 
critical introduction for undergraduate law students to the theories commonly encountered within a 
course on jurisprudence.4 As such, it contains some excellent exposition and discussion of a kind that 
would be quite at home in a more traditional legal philosophy text. In undertaking this task, PoJ 
expressly eschews dealing with sociologically informed empirical legal theory, in favour of a 
2 ‘Normative legal theory must recognise social diversity by explaining law in terms of the regulatory requirements of 
different communities’ (Cotterrell 2003: 257). 
3 See also Cotterrell 2001. 
4 See Cotterrell 1989, Preface. 
                                                          
discussion of the contribution made by legal philosophy (Cotterrell 2003: 3). All of this suggests that 
it would not be fair or appropriate to use this book to stimulate a debate on how sociological methods 
and theories might inform our understanding of the issues typically discussed within legal philosophy. 
But neither is our aim here to criticize PoJ for its limitations, namely what it does not attempt to do. 
Rather, it is to use the material and approaches contained in PoJ to consider what a systems theory 
approach to the issues tackled by legal philosophy offers. We wish to build on those aspects of PoJ 
which offer the beginnings of a synthesis between legal philosophy and the sociology of law. Within 
PoJ, the overall aim or ‘organising framework’ is that the ‘patchwork of philosophical views of the 
nature of law contained in modern Anglo–American jurisprudence can be understood as a response to 
social and political change: but a response shaped substantially by perceived problems arising in the 
professionalisation of legal practice’ (Cotterrell 2003: viii). Using some of the material and discussion 
contained in PoJ we wish to utilize systems theory to explore the nature of such links. First we will 
consider how these links are presented within PoJ, concentrating on Roger’s first substantive chapter, 
his exploration of the common law tradition.5 
1. A Sociology of the Common Law Tradition 
This first substantive chapter and approach to understanding the general nature of law discussed in 
PoJ is about the common law tradition; it is in many ways the most sociological chapter in the book 
and the one that is most closely connected to legal practice. On the other hand, it is also the chapter 
which is least connected to legal philosophy, or indeed any theory, for the practice of the common law 
did not deal in theories as such, but in claims. The common law was claimed to be the expression of 
different things – community, custom, reason, morality, justice and God’s will (see Lobban 1991: 59). 
It was claimed by its practitioners to be unwritten, even when the decisions through which it was 
formed were recorded in law reports. These claims have some logical interconnection so, for example, 
the claim that the source of law lies in community, custom, morality or God’s will supports the claim 
5 This chapter is called ‘The theory of common law’, which may be slightly misleading since it explores the failure of 
common lawyers to develop a theory which could adequately explain the common law. Indeed, Postema (2002) believes that 
common lawyers never articulated a full-fledged philosophical theory of law, only a ‘distinctive approach to understanding 
the nature of law and legal reasoning’ (at 599). 
                                                          
that the law is unwritten, as there is no text which both embodies these sources and expresses the 
content of the common law. The decisions of particular judges are described not as law in themselves, 
but as attempts to identify the law, which lies in these sources. The manner in which these various 
claims operate has echoes of classical natural law, since unjust laws (incorrect identifications of 
justice) are not, therefore, really law – in the sense that they can be discarded in favour of the real or 
higher law to be found through these sources. At the same time, the decisions of judges can also be 
described as the best evidence of that law, for these various sources have been cited to, and considered 
by, those judges on the occasions when they have been asked to provide a new remedy for what is 
claimed to be a pre-existing wrong. 
Whilst these various elements of common law reasoning have a logical connection, it is hard 
to call them a ‘theory’, at least by comparison with something like Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (in 
the 1959 edition), which presents a systematic exposition of the sources of law, the relationships 
between them and the implications of those relationships for everyday legal problems. In place of 
theory, particularly when it took the form of philosophical speculation, common lawyers tended to 
stress the practical nature of common law reasoning, terming it ‘artificial reason’, and claiming that 
the sense of what it required in any particular dispute could only be acquired through being an 
experienced legal practitioner.6 
The discourse of common lawyers prior to the reforms of the nineteenth century poses a 
challenge to any claim that legal practice needs to be closely connected to legal philosophy. Indeed, 
one can go further, and point to the resistance of this discourse to the criticisms of legal philosophers, 
or even empirical evidence. Thomas Hobbes challenged the common lawyers’ claim that the common 
law represented a form of reasoning that could only be known through long practical experience, 
counter-claiming that the reason within law could be gained by a student within a few months 
(1681/1971: 56). And when Bentham (1843: 7, 13, 48–9, 63) insisted that the common law was the 
law of ‘Judge & Co.’, he was not asserting anything which required systematic empirical enquiry, he 
was simply pointing out that the only factual bases for the common law were the decisions of judges, 
6 The classic statement of this is that of Coke 1628: 97b, discussed by Postema 2002: 593‒5. 
                                                          
whatever claims those judges might make as to their sources of inspiration.7 How does one account 
for this state of affairs? Just as one may ask what legal philosophy contributes to legal practice, one 
may also ask what this a-theoretical collection of claims achieved. 
One answer of course is that these claims served the interests of the legal profession. Any 
claim that legal discourse is something different from other forms of discourse, which requires 
particular knowledge, gained through experience, supports claims for professionalism. Such claims, if 
accepted, also legitimate the power that professionals exercise, and the fees that they can charge. And 
in this the common law tradition, as a non-theory, is not so very different from many of the theories 
which followed. Legal positivism, with its attempts to present law as a science (Austin 1832/1955; 
Kelsen 1967), or modern natural law with its various attempts to present law as a restriction on the 
arbitrariness of power (Fuller 1964; Dworkin 1986) can both be understood as theoretical 
contributions to the legitimacy claims of the legal profession. But whilst this may say something 
about the implications of these particular legal philosophies, or even allow us to speculate about the 
political aims of the respective authors,8 what does this tell us about the relationship between legal 
philosophy as an enterprise and legal practice? For whilst some philosophical approaches paint the 
legal profession in a positive light, others decidedly do not. The ‘Jurisprudence of Difference’, 
Derrida inspired deconstruction and the sceptical branch of the ‘Realist’ movement, all challenge the 
claims of today’s legal profession. And in doing this, they are not so very different from Hobbes and 
Bentham, with their criticisms of the discourse of the common lawyers. Even legal positivism, which 
can be understood as a theory which supports modern legal practice, has its origins in writings which 
offered no such supportive role to then existing legal practice. 
In PoJ the reader is invited to consider a two-way relationship between legal practice and 
legal philosophy. Firstly, legal philosophy alters as legal practices change. This could be expected to 
7 For Bentham, the sources of judicial decisions, or at least judicial desire not to reform the laws and procedures which had 
resulted from them, were explicable in terms of professional self-interest: to put money into the pockets of the judges, or the 
lawyers, or the other members of the firm ‘Judge & Co’.  
8 Inviting a consideration of psychological factors, as one finds in the many books of essays representing a ‘progressive 
critique’ of law, such as Kairys 1998.  
                                                          
occur in any branch of applied philosophy, for example, one would expect the philosophy of science 
to be stimulated by changes in scientific practices.9 If there is any controversy in this claim, it arises 
from arguments over the parameters of what is legal practice. Practices claimed to be legal by some 
theories are excluded by others. However, since most modern legal philosophies accept that their 
theories must be applicable to nation state legal systems and their accompanying practices,10 PoJ is on 
fairly firm ground in claiming that changes in legal philosophy occur in response to changes which 
occur to the nature of state legal systems, and it is these kinds of legal systems that are the object of 
most of the philosophies covered by the book. So, for example, it is plausible to suggest that Hart’s 
stress on power conferring rules (Hart 1961) reflects the changing experience of state law in modern 
society, with more individuals experiencing more changes to their legal statuses on a regular basis 
than before, and state power being delegated to more officials through ever more, and ever more 
complex, legal rules.11 So it makes some (sociological) sense to claim that when Hart stresses the 
importance of power conferring rules, he is not really pointing to a feature of law overlooked by prior 
theories, but to something that has a radically greater importance within modern legal practice than it 
did in earlier periods.12 
9 A view which adherents of naturalism would extend to philosophy generally: ‘Naturalism in philosophy is always first a 
methodological view to the effect that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences’ 
(Leiter 2007: 34). 
10 Raz 2009: 105, for example, opines that a theory that did not include clear cases of state law within what it recognized as 
law would not be an adequate theory. 
11 As Maine (1861) famously put it, there has been a change in the basis of modern law from one organized around status, to 
one organized through contracts, an observation that captures the increased importance of power conferring rules within 
private ordering, but neglects their equally growing role as a means to distribute state power.  
12 Cotterrell (2003: 94) argues that this change in legal practice had already been recognised by Austin and that Hart’s desire 
to identify a role for power conferring rules separately from their relationship to duty imposing ones was motivated by a 
‘political concern’ to stress law’s facilitative functions. The problems for Hart, as an analytical philosopher, was that the 
change in legal practice which he sought to identify did not equate to an analytical distinction, as power conferring rules are 
always intertwined with duty imposing ones. 
                                                          
The second part of the philosophy/practice relationship is more problematic. In PoJ the claim 
that there is an important relationship between normative legal theory and legal practice is broken 
down into three questions.13 What practical relevance in professional and political arenas of law does 
normative legal theory have? How does this relate to particular historical conditions? What 
assumptions about the nature of societies underlie these theories? One has to take care here that one 
does not reverse the phrasing of these questions, and return to the previous relationship. The relevance 
of legal practice to legal theory is demonstrable over and over again, as it provides any such theory 
with its object. One can subject such theories to a sociologically informed critical analysis, which 
includes a consideration of the historical conditions which produce both the legal practice that is being 
theorized, and the resultant legal theories. And one can also examine which assumptions about the 
nature of societies might inform legal practices, or the particular legal theories which such practices 
generate. And PoJ does all of this, at various points. But whilst all of this would make sociology 
relevant to legal theory, it does not address the three questions set out above, which focus on the 
relevance of normative legal theory to legal practice. 
If these questions are treated as causal in nature, they are both difficult and easy to answer. It 
is relatively easy to point to the possibility that a particular theory portrays the legal profession in an 
attractive light, and then claim this makes that theory relevant in some meaningful way to legal 
practice. But it is much harder to point to any legal theory and show that, but for the existence of that 
theory, legal practice would not have developed in a particular way. PoJ itself contains a particularly 
stark example of this difference. Maine’s historical school is discussed as an attempt to provide a 
theoretical basis on which to understand the evolution of law, and therefore something which could 
compensate for the absence of such a theory within the discourse of common lawyers. His works were 
widely read by lawyers, and are said to have had ‘immense influence’ (Cotterrell 2003: 45). But there 
is no specific evidence that they had any influence on legal practice. The most obvious route for their 
influence was their inclusion within professional legal education at the end of the nineteenth century, 
13 Cotterrell 2003: 12‒13. The particular aspect of normative legal theory which is to be analysed in its relationship to legal 
practice is legal philosophy’s concern with unity and system in law.  
                                                          
but their lack of relevance to legal practice is perhaps caught by the comments contained in a an early 
nutshell-type guide to Maine’s Ancient Law¸ used by students who had to study this work in order to 
pass the professional examinations: ‘In these books there is a great deal of writing that is absolutely 
useless to the student for examination purposes, and page after page has to be waded through in 
search for a criticism or theory … ’ (Quoted by Cotterrell 2003: 47). 
PoJ provides some evidence of legal theory influencing legal practice. One particular 
example (2003: 194) is Llewellyn’s work on the draft commercial code. This code was clearly 
influenced by Realist views that doctrinal statements could be over general, and thus provide a poor 
guide (on both a normative and predictive level) to the resolution of disputes. Llewellyn aimed to 
identify principles that were more specific and appropriate within a narrower range of contexts than 
had been developed via the common law. And whilst important aspects of his work on the code were 
not enacted, some of it was. But such specific examples also point to the contingencies of the 
influence of theory on practice, and the difficulties of claiming that ‘but for’ a particular legal theory, 
a particular legal practice would not have occurred. 
The relationship between legal theory and legal practice may be open to more sociological 
analysis if one moves from causal questions to functional ones. What function does legal theory play 
within legal practice? And in asking this question, can one do more than re-assert the claims that 
theory which portrays legal practice or the legal profession in an attractive light provides legitimacy? 
One way to approach this kind of question is to consider the work done by theoretical constructs 
within day to day legal practice. How, if at all, does the legal system make use of legal theory in its 
day to day operations? 
It is here that we would wish to introduce systems theory, as developed by Niklas Luhmann.14 
For Roger, systems theory is ‘not sociological enough’ (2003: 250) focusing as it does on law as a 
system of communication, which he feels ignores the professional, political, organizational and 
ideological conditions that have made possible law’s presentation as an autonomous system. There is 
no room here to debate this general accusation, except to say that systems theory does, we feel, no 
14 Particularly his last monograph devoted solely to law: Luhmann 2004.  
                                                          
such thing. Systems of communication operate at various levels. Society as a whole is a social system 
(Luhmann 1985) as are its functional sub-systems (see Luhmann 1982: 229–54), such as law or the 
economy. But so too are interactions (e.g. conversations) and organizations (Luhmann 2005). Thus 
there is no reason to believe that understanding society in terms of systems excludes professional 
bodies or other kinds of organizations. What of political or ideological questions and conditions? 
Tracing how systems exist and change requires one to focus on the operations that their 
communications execute, and the manner in which those operations change as the system’s 
communications change. But this does not mean that the environment is ignored. For example, if one 
wished to consider the relationship between the legal and political system, one would track how each 
evolved in response to the other. To speak meaningfully of a ‘relationship’ between law and politics 
requires us to have a sense of their respective self-limitations: what, in each of them, allows them to 
have stable and on-going (as opposed to fleeting and contingent) reactions to each other. 
One can use systems theory to analyze the role played by theory within legal practice. One 
can ask, along the lines of the first of the questions from PoJ set out above, what work such 
communications might do. What operations do they enable or facilitate that would otherwise have to 
occur in different ways through different communications? PoJ provides the beginnings of this kind 
of enquiry in the chapter on the common law. This chapter includes a quotation from Coke CJ, taken 
from Calvin’s Case (1608):15 
… we are but of yesterday … our days upon the earth are but as a shadow in respect 
of the old ancient days and times past, wherein the laws have been by the wisdom of 
the most excellent men, in many successions of ages, by long and continual 
experience … refined, which no one man (being of so short a time) albeit he had in 
his head the wisdom of all the men in the world … could ever have effected or 
attained unto. And therefore … no man ought to take upon him to be wiser than the 
laws.’ (Cotterrell 2003: 24) 
Roger does not criticize this statement as a mystification or ideological presentation of the common 
law, instead acknowledging it as an honest and direct statement of a set of assumptions that underpin 
the classical conception of common law judging: law is not made by judges but pre-exists their 
15 7 Co Rep 1, 3.  
                                                          
decisions and is simply declared by them; it is unwritten, and lies in customs and the community at 
large; it is identified by judges via their powers of reason and experience, or wisdom. He notes that 
these assumptions amount to a paradox: the law is changed via the endless process of reaching 
judicial decisions, but at every point in this process the law is claimed to pre-exist and lie outside of 
the judicial decisions themselves. Even as the law is changed, it is asserted to be unchanging. Roger 
(2003: 28) presents this paradox as something that was less apparent earlier in the history of the 
common law, when the decisions of judges were not reported. It also had more empirical truth when 
the assizes first began in the twelfth century, when judges went out into communities and took 
evidence of local custom, only combining it into a ‘common law’ thought through their discussions 
amongst themselves on their return to Westminster.16 But according to PoJ (2003: 29), the common 
law tradition ‘backed itself into a corner’ as empirical conditions offered less and less support to the 
assumptions of common law judging. And to the extent that judge-made law remains a feature of the 
legal system, this leaves judges without adequate authority for the decisions which they still have to 
reach. The remedy which he offers, towards the end of PoJ, is for the gap left by the common law 
approach to adjudication to be filled by a more sociologically informed legal theory, which can assist 
jurists to find legal solutions that are appropriate to, and thus representative of, the communities that 
generate legal disputes (2003: 254–66). This offered solution is not only relevant to the role of judges 
within the unitary and unified communities presupposed to exist within nation states. It would require 
the law to engage with the multiple communities that exist both within national state boundaries, and 
across them.17 In making this suggestion, Roger is, in common with many of the legal theories which 
he discusses, reacting to the perceived inadequacies of lawyers’ own accounts of their own practices. 
What could systems theory add to the above analysis? In systems theory the kinds of general 
statement contained in the quote set out above by Coke, made in the course of a court judgement 
(rather than in a pamphlet, lecture or diaries) is a legal communication, and of a particular kind. It is 
16 See Baker 2002: Chapter 2 ‘Origins of the Common Law’, Simpson 1986.  
17 In making these suggestions in the 2nd edition of PoJ, Roger is drawing on his own earlier writings on law and 
communities, most notably Cotterrell 1995, and predisposing himself towards his later writings on ‘transnational law’ (e.g. 
Cotterrell 2008, 2009). 
                                                          
an attempt, within the legal system, to describe the totality of the legal system. Where such 
communications occur within a social subsystem such as law, Luhmann calls them ‘self-
descriptions’.18 There is more here than a change of terminology. The theory identifies a relationship 
between such self-descriptions and other communications within the same system. Within the legal 
system, communications apply the code legal/illegal to various states of affairs. As part of this 
process, the legal system generates communications which observe on the application of that code, 
identifying what it was about state of affairs X that made it legal, in contrast to state of affairs Y, 
which was coded illegal. These observations, within a system, upon that system’s own applications of 
its code, are second order observations.19 Such second order observations stabilize, but do not 
determine, future applications of the code. In the case of law, such observations are more commonly 
called doctrine – the constant attempt to present law as a non-arbitrary application of the legal code by 
generating reasons which distinguish what is legal from what is illegal. Doctrine reduces the 
possibilities of what can be recognized as a meaningful legal communication. In this sense, it 
stabilizes, but does not determine, what will be found to be illegal, or legal. The communications that 
constitute a system’s secondary observations can be at a high or low level of generality. But those at 
the highest level, which attempt to describe the system as a unity, to itself, form self-descriptions. And 
just as law’s second order observation stabilizes, but does not determine, what can be coded 
legal/illegal, self-descriptions have a similar role – stabilizing, but not determining. One might 
describe these second order observations as facilitating the making of further communications within 
a system, but this facilitation cannot be separated from their ability to limit what can be 
18 Luhmann 2004: chapter 11 ‘The Self-description of the Legal System’, and more generally, Luhmann 2013: 167‒349. 
19 ‘While first order observation refers to what an observer observes, second order observation refers to how an observer 
observes’ (Borch 2011: 57). Second order observation can be internal (self-observation) when the communications of a 
system observe on the system’s own application of its own distinctions, or external (hetero-observation) when a system uses 
its communications to observe upon the communications of another system. 
                                                          
communicated. It is only by limiting the possible selection of what might connect next to any 
communication, which makes complex and technical forms of communication possible.20 
This conceptual scheme focuses our attention, as Roger rightly observes in PoJ, on the 
internal operations of a system, and the possibilities that exist, at any moment, for further 
communication, including evolution of the system, which alter the possibilities of what can be 
communicated. He is critical of this: ‘the system is portrayed as having a life of its own in some sense. 
The social context that gives it that apparent life remains only very faintly sketched. The particular 
forces and interests that give rise to law’s development, inspire its interpretation and guarantee its 
authority remain vague in autopoiesis theory’ (250). 
Let us examine this criticism, in the context of PoJ’s discussion of the common law. What 
role is played, within law, by self-descriptions in the form set out above by Coke. Our observation is 
that they facilitate legal judgements within a legal system that faces changing social conditions, where 
the political system generates (relative to modern conditions) relatively small amounts of legislation. 
In this, as Roger notes in PoJ, the common law attribution of law to the customs of the community 
duplicated what on the continent was achieved by natural law (2003: 116). Within natural law, any 
local jurisdiction is, at best, an expression of a higher law. A local law that is unjust is not really a law 
and, as such, a judge who finds such a law to be unjust, is not legislating, or even changing the law, 
but simply identifying the law, and correcting an earlier misunderstanding of what the law truly is. In 
the case of the common law, by describing the law as a standard of right and wrong that lies within 
the community, common lawyers left law open to change in response to changing conditions. If a 
dispute revealed a new injustice, the common law would seek to provide a remedy. The sense of 
injustice which governed this process was not a utopian assessment of the whole social order, for that 
would open the law to forms of argument that would remove its ability to resolve disputes or support 
powerful interests. Instead common lawyers looked out on the world using the lenses of the common 
law (Cotterrell 2003: 32). When identifying a new wrong that needed a new remedy, they would 
20 ‘ … structure, whatever else it may be, consists in how permissible relations are constrained within the system … . Only 
by excluding almost all conceivable linkages can there be something like: “Would you give me a refill?” “You’ve forgotten 
to clean the back seat of the car!” or “Tomorrow at three at the movie theater ticket office!”’ (Luhmann 1995: 283) 
                                                          
compare the claimed new wrong with whatever wrongs had previously been recognized by the 
common law. This is not simply a situation of filling in gaps. Wrongs which had not been recognized 
in past decisions could return to court in a situation where the urgency of the need for remedy had 
increased, or the distinction between this claim and recognized claims had decreased. In this situation, 
as the common law communicated to itself that the decisions of judges were simply the best evidence 
of law, and not the law itself, a judge who accepted a previously rejected claim as a wrong that needed 
a remedy was not making law, but only correcting an earlier mistaken identification of the law. 
This functional analysis of the common law’s self-description invites the question, why did 
this disappear from legal discourse. What changed? The answer given in PoJ, with which we would 
agree, is that the law changed; in particular, due to changes outside of the legal system, particularly in 
the political system. Parliament began to issue huge amounts of technical and specific legislation, 
especially in response to the demands of the new middle classes. This was experienced in the courts, 
and amongst the legal profession, as changes in the forms of legal argument. Prior to this expansion in 
the amount and nature of legislation, statutes were treated, like judges decisions, as remedies for 
wrongs, and evidence of the wrongs that they remedied.21 They were regarded as inferior evidence to 
court decisions, but with a higher authority in the sense that they had, at least in the immediate 
aftermath of their passage, to be followed.22 With the change in the nature of legislation, the self-
observations which generated the common law self-description altered. So much of the law (the 
application of the code legal/illegal) was law for one reason alone – it was the intention of Parliament. 
This acceptance of authority was already present alongside the common law tradition, but with the 
change in the amount and nature of statute, authority, rather than the identification of community 
values, became the dominant basis for legal decisions. It became implausible to continue to claim that 
statutes are a remedy for an existing wrong lying within the community, when the overwhelming 
mass of legislation was seeking to change society. It also became difficult to use the existing law as a 
framework from which to identify principles or maxims, and in turn use these to identify particular 
21 The idea that Parliament provided remedies for existing wrongs, led to the recognition of those wrongs, like the decisions 
of judges, being communicated as declaration of standards that already existed within the community. (Stoner 1992: 37‒8) 
22 An authority from which there was no appeal: McIllwain 1910. 
                                                          
examples of injustice, when so much of the law became detailed, specific, and self-evidently partisan. 
And when the dominant basis for legal argumentation took the form of an acknowledgement of the 
need to identify and give effect to the intention of Parliament, the self-description changed. What we 
would now call positivist self-descriptions replaced the common law tradition in England, whilst on 
the continent they replaced various forms of natural law self-descriptions. 
This history, most of which is found in the PoJ’s discussion of the common law tradition, 
would seem to suggest that law does, in very important ways, have a ‘life of its own’. The self-
description of the common law as the customs of the community, like the functionally equivalent 
natural law self-descriptions found on the continent, were a feature of law for hundreds of years. As 
such these self-descriptions cannot be attributed in any direct way to the incalculable number of 
events that occurred within law’s environment during this period. But this does not mean that law was 
un-influenced by its environment. Rather, the self-description of law formed a significant aspect of 
law’s reaction to, and evolution within, the rest of society. At a time when legislation was, by today’s 
standards, relatively infrequent, the dominant way in which the rest of society sought to influence 
law’s communications was by bringing claims to courts. Law responded to these claims by evolving 
its doctrines, and in the process, both generated and utilized its self-description as an expression of 
community values. 
2. A Sociological Theory of Jurisprudence 
In this section we wish to discuss what systems theory might offer to a discussion of legal theory 
more generally.The second edition of PoJ contains its own introduction to systems theory, which 
acknowledges that systems theory, with its acceptance that systems contain paradoxes, would echo 
post-modern theories’ focus on the circularity and arbitrariness of the postulates which inform much 
legal philosophy.23 Roger claims that ‘theorists of autopoeisis’ simply answer: ‘True, but so what? 
This is how law is, and works, it does its job’ (249). This statement, like the claim that the ‘particular 
forces and interests that give rise to law’s development, inspire its interpretation and guarantee its 
23 Luhmann insisted that his own theoretical writings sought to explain the modern. He did not acknowledge a separate stage 
of social development which was ‘post-modern’ (see specifically Luhmann 2000) but only the inadequacy of pre-modern 
concepts to explain modern conditions (see generally Luhmann 1998).  
                                                          
authority remain vague in autopoiesis theory’ (250) had more truth at the time that the second edition 
of PoJ was published, than they do today. 24 As a theory of society, systems theory is necessarily 
abstract. But, like other sociological theories, the issue is not whether the general theory contains lots 
of information about social phenomena, but whether, in its application, it can generate concrete 
observations. Thus, for example, the concept of structural coupling,25 or co-evolution,26 which is 
Luhmann’s answer to how closed systems interact with each other in stable and predictable ways, 
seems no more than a suggestive metaphor. But in our work on reporting of miscarriages of justice we 
have been able to use this concept to analyze and describe important aspects of the relationship 
between law and the mass media.27 And in terms of organizing data, the recent work by Chris 
Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions, is a tour de force in its utilization of historical sources, and 
systems theory, to present the evolution of states and constitutions as a consequence of the increased 
power which became available to power holders through its expression in, and consequent restrictions 
by, law. These works,28 like the above consideration of how the changing nature of statute triggered a 
change in the legal system’s self-description, are not ignoring the forces that give rise to law’s 
development and authority. On the contrary, they are using systems theory to organize complex data 
and increase our understanding of these forces. And what of the role played by paradox within 
24 Because, at least as far as English speakers are concerned, some of Luhmann’s major works had not been published as 
translations. 
25 Structural coupling occurs when a system ‘presupposes certain features of its environment on an ongoing basis and relies 
on them structurally … . the forms of structural coupling reduce and so facilitate influences of the [system’s] environment 
on the system’. Luhmann 2004: 382, and generally with regard to the legal system’s structural coupling with other systems, 
see ch.10. With regard to how this applies to society in general, its operational closure and structural coupling with its 
environment, see Luhmann 2012: 49‒68. 
26 On co-evolution with law, see Teubner 1993: ch.4 ‘Blind Legal Evolution’.  
27 See Nobles and Schiff 2000, 2004. For a succinct statement of the nature of structural coupling between law and the mass 
media, see Nobles and Schiff 2013b. On the structural coupling between law and politics, and the general nature of structural 
coupling, see Nobles and Schiff 2013a, chs. 6 and 7. 
28 For a further selection, see Febbrajo and Harste 2013. There are numerous examples of the application of systems theory 
on the Continent, and especially in German academic literature where its presence is ever growing and its significance 
increasing. 
                                                          
systems theory?29 Far from simply accepting that paradox occurs, systems theory directs us towards 
observation of how and when paradox occurs within systems, and what functions it plays. 
Let us begin with the paradox which Roger identifies within the common law: that judges 
claim to identify a law which exists prior to the decision which establishes it as law. Systems theory 
has something more to offer here than simple acceptance of this. For a start, what it offers is a clearer 
idea of where the paradox is situated. This paradox lies within the legal system, in the 
communications used in adjudication. It does not lie in the beliefs or communications of judges as 
individuals. Judges are free to acknowledge, to themselves, that their decisions are acts of legislation, 
structured by their own political beliefs and commitments. They may even, when acting in non-
judicial capacities, such as public lectures, admit to making law on this basis. But in their courts 
judges receive arguments that state what the law is, not what it ought to become, and their judgements 
follow the same form – they articulate what the law is.30 In keeping with this form of communication, 
decisions that mark a break with previous articulations of the law are still applied retrospectively, as if 
the decision reached in the case had always been the law. And this paradox has, if anything hardened, 
with the change to more positivistic self-descriptions. When it comes to statutory interpretation, any 
change of interpretation, no matter how radical, is routinely taken to have always been the law from 
29 As an example of the crucial role of paradox within systems theory, see Luhmann 2013: 293‒305, and within law(s) more 
generally, Perez and Teubner 2006.  
30 See Nobles and Schiff 2009 and 2013a: 147‒63. The paradox is not removed on the rare and exceptional occasions when 
judges admit, even within the judgements that constitute their decisions, that their decisions represent new law. There are at 
least two reasons for this. Firstly, because the paradox remains present, but suppressed, on every occasion when no such 
admission is made and a decision is reached that is not simply an expression of the existing law. As such, no modern legal 
theorist except Dworkin (and he only during the period when he claimed that the communications of judges alluded to an 
omnipresent ‘right answer’) has denied that the paradox occurs within legal adjudication. The only issue that remains 
between legal theorists is how often this is the case, and on what basis, if any, it can sometimes not apply (i.e. when it is 
correct for judges to claim that their judgments merely apply existing law rather than create new law). The second reason, is 
that even on the rare occasions where judges admit in their judgements to be making law, this is still not presented in terms 
of a political decision or utilitarianism or efficiency, but on the basis that the decisions reached would be an extension of the 
present law, or a just solution in light of the context provided by accepted law. 
                                                          
the moment that the statute was brought into force. This is not because judges cannot see that 
changing the interpretation of a statute amounts to a change in the standards that will be applied in 
future, and therefore a change in the law. It is that the very communication that is routinely used to 
claim authority for the interpretation of law (giving effect to the intention of Parliament) provides no 
basis for putting temporal limitations on the operation of that interpretation. 
The claim that this paradox lies within the legal system as a system of communication, and 
not in the minds of judges, or within the communications of other systems (such as legal philosophy 
as a sub-system of education) is related to another distinction that systems theory helps us to draw: the 
difference between what is external and what is internal to the legal system. We agree with Roger, 
that it is ‘necessary to discard any simple distinction between legal insiders and outsiders, or 
participants in and observers of law’ (2003: 258). Systems theory operates on the basis that there is 
not simply an inside and an outside to a system of communication. Firstly, a system creates itself 
through its own communications. But it does this through communications that refer both to itself, 
and its environment.31 So, for example, when a legal system deals with claims, or evidence, it is 
recognizing a society that exists outside of itself. It does this with communications that identify the 
procedures for recognizing claims and evidence as itself – the law, and identifying the events that are 
being urged and proved as lying outside of the law. So the first sense in which there is an outside and 
an inside is the boundary that a system constantly creates, for itself, by generating self and hetero-
references using its own communications. The second sense in which one can have an inside or 
outside is when one observes the communications of a system (both the self and the hetero-references) 
and acknowledges that this is not the manner in which that system and its environment would be 
described through the communications of another system. To give an example of these two kinds of 
inside/outside distinctions, consider how the legal system routinely utilizes science as evidence. When 
this occurs, the legal system does not regard science as part of law just because it has relevance to 
law. Within the legal system, within discussion of evidence, it will be the norms that establish 
31 ‘ … the system always reproduces a double reference: the distinction between self-reference and other-reference’ 
(Luhmann 2012: 53). 
                                                          
relevance that are treated as law, whilst the science is external to law. This is the first kind of 
inside/outside. By contrast to this, a scientist observing on the manner in which the legal system uses 
science, might well claim that what the law treats as science is not really science at all. This is the 
second sense of being outside of the legal system. 
It is this second version of being inside or outside a system that comes closest to the debate, 
within much legal philosophy, on whether the existence of law depends on some insider, or 
participant’s perspective. This is usually addressed in terms of the insider’s understanding of, and 
commitment to, the law, with debate on whether the object of this insider attitude is rules, norms, 
principles, etc. As such, it is typically focused on the legal system’s self-reference, tending to ignore 
hetero-reference. In his call for a more sociologically informed jurisprudence, Roger is alert to this 
hetero-reference: the manner in which law forms its own version of society.32 This is clearest in his 
discussion of the common law, where he is acknowledges that common lawyers looked out at society 
‘through the lenses of the common law’ (2003: 32) i.e. they formed a view of society in the course of 
legal operations. As with the paradox of adjudication, systems theory indicates that the internal 
attitude, or participant’s perspective, is not something located in the psyche of individuals, but in the 
system itself. 
The idea of a perspective being located within a system, rather than it being an attribute of the 
human beings whose voices or bodily movements are interpreted as the utterances by that system, is 
difficult to grasp. But an example may make clearer what this involves.33 The communications which 
are used in law to reach decisions and execute operations typically take a normative form. This 
normative form will have an implicit meaning that the person who is identified as speaker or writer 
32 In the preface to the first edition of PoJ, Roger declares an intention to bring ‘to light assumptions contained within [legal 
philosophy] about the social, political and professional environment of law’ (1989: viii, 2003: vi); and in the first chapter 
entitled ‘Legal Philosophy in Context’ he argues that ‘because “the legal” can never be totally separated from such matters 
which normative legal theory often treats as external to law, the theory itself often implies interesting ideas about the very 
social context with it apparently seeks to exclude from its concerns … these ideas … often reveal basic presuppositions on 
which normative legal theory is based’ (2003: 18). Though in our view, the focus here should be on the assumptions which 
law has about its environment, rather than the assumptions which philosophy makes when seeking to describe law. 
33 This example is developed more fully in Nobles and Schiff 2009.  
                                                          
has a normative commitment towards law. This does not mean that the person in question has any 
such commitment, in the sense of some psychic identification with law as an appropriate 
configuration of ‘oughts’. It is just that legal operations (claims, legal arguments, legal judgements, 
etc.) cannot be executed without using communications whose implicit meaning includes this 
commitment. (This is the experience which makes the political radical on trial refuse to recognize the 
court or participate in the proceedings. Attempts to affect communications within the legal system 
constitute an implicit affirmation of commitment to the normativity of the system of which the 
communication forms a part).34 Law can be described in a non-committed fashion when one is not 
seeking to execute legal operations, even by lawyers. And there are some legal operations, such as the 
giving of advice to clients, which can be presented though communications that are only predictive or 
instrumental (the so-called ‘bad man’ approach to law). But this kind of communication will not 
execute a valid judgement, or make an effective legal argument. 
If the perspective of an insider is understood to be the meaning of the communications that 
construct the legal system – communications whose meanings which identify the relevant human 
beings as speakers and attribute normative commitments to them – then we can see that the insider 
perspective is not limited to lawyers. It is a feature of legal communications involving lay people too. 
Any person who is understood to make a legal claim – ’don’t park there, it’s a double yellow line’ is 
an insider in the sense that the communications that they are understood to have made contain an 
implicit endorsement by them of the normativity of the legal system.35 On the same basis, a judge 
whose diaries proclaim that they made legal judgements on the grounds of their strongly held personal 
views, or even bribes, is not an insider. These communications do not execute legal operations 
(though they may later trigger appeals by being recognized by the legal system as evidence of 
impropriety). Instead of looking at who is communicating – which kind of human being is involved – 
we move to focus on the communications themselves – what communications are in play here? This 
approach not only sharpens our sense of what is involved in internal attitudes, but also points to a 
34 While the law remains deaf to communications which challenge or fail to recognize its right to determine what it identifies 
as the legal issues. See Chistodoulidis 1998: 175‒6 discussing the Baader-Meinhof proceedings. 
35 See Nobles and Schiff (2013a: 34‒46).  
                                                          
wider, less exclusively judge or lawyer centred understanding of what constitutes the legal within 
society. 
At this point we can return to consider how one might tackle the first of Roger’s three 
questions about the relevance of legal philosophy to legal practice: what practical relevance in 
professional and political arenas of law does normative legal theory have? In PoJ the focus is on the 
possibility that particular theories might serve to present the legal profession in such a way as to 
increase the political support that it might receive, or the fees which it might charge. But we propose 
taking this question more literally, and asking what work jurisprudence (in the sense of broad 
statements about law at its most general) does within the legal system. The distinction which we wish 
to draw is between jurisprudence as self-description, and jurisprudence as legal philosophy. 
Jurisprudence as legal philosophy, with its concern with what is most general about the legal system, 
adopts structures similar to the system which it is seeking to describe. It tends towards abstraction, 
seeking to identify what is general rather than what is particular. In so doing, it replicates the 
increased generality that is involved in the process of secondary observation, and in turn, self-
description. Self-description, in law as in other social systems, does important work in establishing 
and maintaining a system’s identity. But the criteria and restrictions as to what, within philosophy, 
represents an acceptable description of a system are not the same features that establish what, within a 
system, is generated as its self-description. The example of common law self-description and its 
displacement by positivist self-descriptions suggests that a system does not readily alter its self-
description in response to external critique. Self-descriptions are generated within a system by the 
operations which that self-description facilitates, and they are re-affirmed by those same operations. If 
the operations change, then the self-descriptions that they generate can be expected to alter, as 
occurred within the legal system with the changing nature and volume of legislation. This is a 
reflexive relationship, in the sense that what is being created by law’s operations (its self-description) 
is in turn stabilizing (by restricting the possibilities) of what constitutes law’s operations. Law is 
cognitively open, at the level of self-description as at any other level. This means it can adopt 
communications from its environment. It must therefore be open to legal philosophy as a source of 
communications that could facilitate its operations. But this also means that it remains closed to 
communications from the outside that would paralyze its operations. 
Applying this systems theory approach, one can see that legal theories which have equal 
degrees of logical coherence and philosophical respectability may have quite different possibilities for 
having a second existence (second coding) within the legal system. At what point within the legal 
system could one introduce a deconstructionist argument, or the more extreme forms of realist 
arguments?36 Adjudication cannot be executed by claiming that law is what the judges say it is, or that 
everything could be different, for such communications provide no basis for the kinds of inter-
connected communications that are legal arguments. The same applies to empirical observations on 
the influence of class, race or gender on legal decisions. Whatever the nature of these causal factors, 
they cannot operate within law as communications which explain the law to itself, in the course of its 
own operations. Any judge who is ‘honest’ enough to admit in the course of their judgements their 
decision on a case is the result of their class, gender or race is not offering a communication which fits 
with those which will have established the legal issues before them. How can such judges articulate 
their judgements as the product of their class, race, gender or self-interest without attributing the same 
meanings to the precedents cited to them? And how are such judges to decide the issues in question, if 
the communications that construct their judgements affirm that other judges who come from a 
different class, or gender, would decide the matter differently? However much these social factors 
may influence legal decisions, they cannot be internalized within them, without interrupting the ability 
of law routinely to construct issues, decide cases and execute its other operations. And if they cannot 
form part of law’s self-observations, they cannot in turn form its self-descriptions. 
Similar considerations are relevant to the law’s construction of itself as a unity. Rather than 
trying to form a judgement on the extent to which law is, or is not, deserving of this description, or 
attributing its retention to the self-interest of legal professionals, one can examine the role played by 
this self-description within the operations of law. Our answer is informed by long historical 
36 See Nobles and Schiff 2006: chapter 6 ‘Law’s Politics: Criticising Critical Legal Studies’.  
                                                          
circumstances, going back to the re-discovery of Roman law in the eleventh century.37 The 
assumption that law is a unity and that its parts were systematically inter-related in a manner that can 
be elucidated through arguments of practical reasoning marked the beginning of the development of 
legal communications as institutionalized doctrine. As a set of implicit meanings, they are re-affirmed 
in every attempt by lawyers to contextualize any legal issue within any wider set of legal propositions. 
The ‘truth’ (if one can talk of such a thing) that legal communications do not deserve such a self-
description will not stop the forms of argumentation which implicitly affirm such self-descriptions, or 
at least not until forms of inter-connection evolve which dispense with the need for such implicit 
meanings. 
These observations have implications for some of the claims made in PoJ about the 
possibilities for law to become less unified. It is one thing to say that lower courts develop different 
interpretations of legal provisions from higher courts, or that the police frequently develop 
interpretations that differ from those of lawyers. But it is quite another to claim that these differences 
of interpretation can themselves form part of the communications which occur – i.e. that they can 
become self-conscious communications. And where they cannot, as when a judge or advocate cannot 
articulate that their own race or gender as the basis of their interpretation, then these factors, however 
much they may influence the actors’ attempts to communicate, will not form part of the legal system. 
The legal system will continue to carry out its operations through communications that fail to 
recognize these factors. To borrow and develop some of Brian Leiter’s writings on legal realism, one 
can have legal reasons, and non-legal reasons. Some of these non-legal reasons may be capable of 
forming communications within the system, and offer possibilities for connections to further 
communications. Examples of these might be the judges’ presentations of the justice of the cases 
before them. But other kinds of non-legal reasons may not be able to form communications within the 
system at all – or not without undoing the operations which the actors are hoping to induce. Thus 
judges who attribute their decisions to their own race, class or subjective experiences are likely to be 
interpreted, within the legal system, as having made errors, due to bias. These kinds of factors may be 
37 Watson 1991, Stein 1999. 
                                                          
shown, through other kinds of observation (such as statistical analysis) to make a clear and consistent 
difference to the reaching of particular classes of decisions. But if they cannot themselves form the 
subject of communications then they will not simply be non-legal in the sense that the legal system 
itself identifies them as something, in addition to its formal norms, that can make a difference to a 
decision. These reasons will be non-legal in a much stronger sense: that they are excluded from the 
legal system. 
In offering systems theory as a sociological approach for investigating the role played by 
jurisprudence within the legal system we wish to end by saying something about the role of humans, 
for we suspect that the manner in which this theory de-centres the role of the human actor, is the 
source of at least some of the resistance which it has generated within the sociology of law (including 
the resistance presented by Roger in PoJ). From the perspective of this theory, human beings are not 
part of the legal system. This follows from a larger and even more shocking assertion that human 
beings lie outside of society. For systems theory, society consists of communications, for only these, 
rather than human thoughts (consciousness) or the internal biological or chemical states of particular 
human beings, have a social existence. The biology, chemistry or consciousness of human beings can 
become social as subjects and objectives of (and therefore within) communication. But so can stars 
and planets, which are accepted to lie outside of society. To quote the title of a recent book by 
Michael King, Systems, not People, Make Society Happen. But this understanding of humans as 
outside of society, does not lead to an indifference to human beings in our understanding of society. 
First, systems theory does not exclude most of what is attributed, within sociology, to the human 
actor. Beliefs, conventions, norms and intentions are observable, but they are only observable, as 
communication.38 Second, society and law as part of society, requires the involvement of humans. 
Unless humans are motivated to seek what operations achieve the necessary communications do not 
38 A communication is a unit of meaning within society, and as such, includes not only language but symbols and gestures. A 
thought is a unit of meaning within consciousness. The possibility of meaning having two existences, within communication 
and within thought, makes society possible.  
                                                          
occur.39 Conversely, where humans are motivated to seek the operations of a system, communication 
will continue, despite theories that suggest that the communications which affect those operations are 
groundless, paradoxical, etc. Which, returning to our discussion of PoJ, tells us something about the 
potential of philosophical critique to alter the operations of law, or any other social system. 
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